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Recommender systems have been widely advocated as a way of coping with the problem of infor-
mation overload for knowledge workers. Given this, multiple recommendation methods have been
developed. However, it has been shown that no one technique is best for all users in all situations.
Thus we believe that effective recommender systems should incorporate a wide variety of such
techniques and that some form of overarching framework should be put in place to coordinate the
various recommendations so that only the best of them (from whatever source) are presented to
the user. To this end, we show that a marketplace, in which the various recommendation methods
compete to offer their recommendations to the user, can be used in this role. Speciﬁcally, this article
presents the principled design of such a marketplace (including the auction protocol, the reward
mechanism, and the bidding strategies of the individual recommendation agents) and evaluates
the market’s capability to effectively coordinate multiple methods. Through analysis and simula-
tion, we show that our market is capable of shortlisting recommendations in decreasing order of
user perceived quality and of correlating the individual agent’s internal quality rating to the user’s
perceived quality.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.1.m [Models and Principles]: Miscellaneous; H.3.3
[Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information Search and Retrieval—Information ﬁltering;
H.3.4 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Systems and Software—Performance evaluation
(efﬁciency and effectiveness); I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence—
Multiagent systems
General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web (the Web) [Berners-Lee et al. 1992] presents us with a
vast array of information. Also, regardless of the metric used (i.e., growth in
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the number of networks, hosts, users, or trafﬁc), the Internet is growing at
least 10 percent per month and the content of the Web grows by an estimated
170,000 pages daily [Turban et al. 2000, p. 495]. When taken together, these
factors make it very hard to know what documents are out there, let alone ﬁnd
theonesthataremostsuitableforthetaskathand.Toaddressthisinformation
overload problem, a range of tools to assist with indexing, retrieving, searching,
and ﬁltering have been developed [Zamboni 1998; Pinkerton 2000; Howe and
Dreilinger 1997; Yan and Garcia-Molina 1995]. However, while these tools can
certainly assist in this endeavor, they are typically not personalized to individ-
ual users or their prevailing context [Sheth and Maes 1993]. Additionally, such
tools still tend to have the weakness of either providing too much irrelevant
information or missing relevant information [Goldberg et al. 1992].
To overcome these limitations, recommender systems have been advocated.
Recommender systems help make choices among recommendations from all
kinds of sources without the users needing to have sufﬁcient personal ex-
perience of all these alternatives [Resnick and Varian 1997]. Thus, in this
context a recommendation is viewed as a reference to an item that will be
directed to the user who is looking for information. A typical recommender sys-
tem aggregates and directs recommendations to appropriate recipients. Given
this view, it can be seen that a recommender system’s main value lies in
information aggregation and its ability to match the recommendations with
people seeking information. It differs from conventional ﬁltering systems in
that recommendations are based upon subjective values assigned by people,
namely, the quality of items, rather than more objective properties (such as
the text content of a document) of the items themselves [Resnick et al. 1994;
Shardanand and Maes 1995]. Compared to a system that only has searching
or other simple information ﬁltering functionalities, recommender systems re-
quire less experience on the part of the user and less effort to specify and
restrain their interests when querying and operating the system [Resnick
and Varian 1997]. This is because recommender systems provide their users
with recommendations that have been recognized as good (based on their pre-
viously expressed preferences or the preferences of other users with similar
interests).
Against this background, this research is concerned with the problem of
information overload on the Web and in how recommender systems can be
used to help overcome this problem. In particular, it deals with the “where to
go next” problem by presenting recommendations (represented as URLs) that
are relevant to the users’ current browsing context. This method is beneﬁ-
cial since users often ask questions such as “What else should I read?” and
“Where do other people go from here?” By convention, such recommendations
are usually displayed in a separate window without interrupting a user’s cur-
rent navigation (Figure 1 is an example of the system that we have built for this
task).
To date, two typical kinds of ﬁltering approaches have been used to produce
recommendations: content-based and collaborative ﬁltering (see Section 2 for
more details). The former makes recommendations by analyzing the similarity
between the contents of the items that are ready to be recommended and those
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Fig. 1. Browser with recommendations. The main window displays the user’s current context (the
page being viewed). The side bar on the left is the output of the recommender system and displays
a list of URLsi ndecreasing order of relevance to the user’s current context.
that have previously been marked as liked by the user. The latter makes rec-
ommendations by putting forward items that have been deemed appropriate by
people who have similar interests to the user. Based on these two techniques, a
large number of recommendation ﬁltering methods have been developed (again
see Section 2 for more details). However, most conventional recommender sys-
tems share two major weaknesses:
(1) Eachrecommendersystemtypicallyembedssomespeciﬁcalgorithmtocom-
pute correlations (the similarity of two relevant objects). However, there is
no universally best way of doing this (and nor do we believe that there will
ever be such a method). Rather, it is always the case that some methods
are better under particular conditions and others are better under other
conditions [Breese et al. 1998]. Given this, we believe the solution is to
have a suite of recommendation methods available and to have the system
automatically detect which one is the most appropriate in the prevailing
context. However, such coordination is very difﬁcult to attain, because the
outputs from these diverse methods need to be compared.
(2) As ever more information is available on the Web, the pool from which
recommendations can be made will continue to grow. However, users do not
want correspondingly more recommendations to be presented (otherwise
they will be overloaded). Thus, there is a need to be ever more selective and
ensure that only the most appropriate recommendations are put forward.
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Fig. 2. Different valuations of quality.
Given these observations, we believe the best way forward in this area is
to allow the multiple recommendation methods to coexist and to provide an
overarching system that coordinates their outputs such that only the best
recommendations (from whatever source or method) are presented to the
user [Moreau et al. 2002]. To this end, a market-based approach is an efﬁ-
cient means of achieving such coordination because the problem of selecting
appropriate recommendations to display in the sidebar space can be viewed as
one of scarce resource allocation and markets are an efﬁcient solution for this
classofproblems[Clearwater1996;WellmanandWurman1998].Moreover,the
underlyingeconomictheoryprovidesananalyticalframeworkforpredictingag-
gregate behavior and designing individual information providers [Mullen and
Wellman 1995]. Speciﬁcally, in this article, we report on the design and evalu-
ation of a market-based system capable of recommending documents relevant
to the users’ current browsing context as a way of dealing with the problem of
information overload.1
To deal with information overload, all recommender systems share the same
objective of improving recommendation quality. However, most of the existing
systems lack a means of (i) speciﬁcally deﬁning the quality of recommendations
from the viewpoint of the user and the various recommendation methods (since
these may well differ); (ii) correlating these different qualities in a meaningful
manner. In more detail, given a speciﬁc recommendation provided by a recom-
mendingagentwithaspeciﬁcrecommendationmethod,auser’svaluationofthe
recommendation may differ from that of the agent. For example, in Figure 2,
a particular recommending agent might highly rate a recommendation and
therefore wish to highlight it to the user. However, the user may see this as
a poor-quality recommendation that is not very relevant. Given this situation,
the quality of a recommendation can be viewed from two viewpoints. From
the viewpoint of the user, how well a recommendation satisﬁes him (or her) is
1In this work, we are not concerned with developing new recommendations methods. Our aim is
to efﬁciently coordinate existing methods so that the overall system produces the best information
to the user (i.e., the performance of our system is reliant on the effectiveness of the constituent
recommendation methods and what the market does is to allow the best recommendation to be
highlighted). We do not compare the relative performance of the methods. Rather our concern lies
with the fact that different methods make recommendations simultaneously and we let the user
decide which recommendations are good (irrespective of the speciﬁc methods they are provided by).
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termed the user perceived quality (UPQ). From the viewpoint of a recommending
agent with a speciﬁc recommendation method, the relevance score it computes
for a particular recommendation is termed its internal quality (INQ). Moreover,
the INQ values produced by different methods can vary signiﬁcantly from one
another (even for the same document). Therefore, without a systematic means
of relating the UPQ to the recommendation methods’ INQs, it is very difﬁcult to
provide high-quality recommendations. In this research, the key challenge is
the design of a reward mechanism (which reﬂects the user’s satisfaction of the
recommendations) so that the marketplace can effectively correlate these two
values. In sum, the key role of our marketplace is to try to connect the INQ
and UPQ values by imposing a reward regime that incentivizes different recom-
mending agents to bid in a manner that establishes an appropriate correlation
between these values and their bid prices. In this way, the marketplace can be
viewed as a black box with recommendations provided by different recommend-
ing agents as the input and only a few best recommendations passed through
to the user as the output.
Inmoredetail,theworkpresentedinthisarticleadvancesthestateoftheart
in the following ways. First, the marketplace that we designed for this task pro-
videsamethodforcoordinatingthebehaviorofmultiplerecommendationmeth-
ods with diverse measures of INQ.N oother recommender system has attempted
to incorporate multiple approaches in this way. Existing hybrid ﬁltering sys-
tems do attempt to combine different techniques into one system. However,
they do so in a rigid and predetermined way, rather than in a context-speciﬁc
manner that depends on the user’s feedback. Second, our market automati-
cally optimizes the recommender system’s performance so that it can shortlist
recommendations in decreasing order of the user’s preference. Speciﬁcally, the
market works as a black box, with a large number of recommendations from
various methods as the input and a small number of items as the output, and
its performance in terms of presenting recommendations is always equivalent
to that of the best method inside the black box. Third, the market design forces
(incentivizes) the individual recommending methods to adapt their behavior so
as to align their suggestions with the feedback received from the user. Thus,
the market correlates the agents’ internal valuation and the user’s valuation of
the recommendations by invoking a bidding and a rewarding regime. Fourth,
the market is highly efﬁcient and effective as an economic system. Speciﬁcally,
it is Pareto-optimal, maximizes social welfare, and is stable and fair to all com-
ponent methods integrated in the system (see Section 3 for details). In making
these contributions, our aim is to establish, in principle, the viability of the
market-based approach to recommender systems. Given this, the actual con-
struction of a real system that operates with actual user inputs is beyond the
scope of the current work and is left for the future.
The remainder of the article is structured in the following way. We ﬁrst
outline the related work in terms of diverse ﬁltering approaches and market-
based recommender systems in Section 2. Building on past work, we introduce
the design of the marketplace from the perspectives of the protocol, the reward
mechanism,andthebiddingstrategyinSection3.Wethenevaluatethemarket-
place through simulation and demonstrate how it can correlate the component
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methods’ INQs and the user’s UPQso fthe recommendations in Section 4. Finally,
we conclude and point to future work in Section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
To date, a large number of recommendation techniques have been developed.
These are, however, based mainly on content-based and collaborative ﬁltering
(although there is also some work on hybrid and demographic ﬁltering tech-
niques). Each of these categories will be examined in turn in the remainder of
this section.
Content-based ﬁltering approaches recommend items for the user based on
thedescriptionsofpreviouslyevaluateditems.Suchapproachesarewidelyused
in making recommendations of information items. For example, Syskill recom-
mends Web documents based on users’ binary ratings (“hot” and “cold”) of their
interests [Pazzani et al. 1996] and Newsweeder helps users ﬁlter Usenet news
articles by learning the user’s proﬁle based on his or her ratings [Lang 1995].
Generally speaking, however, content-based ﬁltering approaches have a num-
ber of weaknesses in recommending good items. First, a user’s selection is often
based on the subjective attributes of the item [Goldberg et al. 1992], whereas
content-based approaches are based on objective information about the items
and do not take the user’s perceived valuation of such subjective attributes into
account [Montaner et al. 2003]. This makes it impossible to compute the rele-
vance of items with no machine-parsable format (such as sound and video ﬁles).
To this end, our market-based recommender system, by integrating both collab-
orative and content-based ﬁltering methods, can meet the user’s subjective re-
quirements in the way that when subjective attributes are the user’s interests,
recommendations from collaborative (to be discussed in the next paragraph)
component recommenders will be at the top of the shortlist (mutatis mutandis
for objective attributes). Second, content-based ﬁltering techniques do not have
an inherent method for generating serendipitous ﬁnds [Shardanand and Maes
1995]. They tend to recommend more of what the user has already seen. In com-
parison, again, our market-based approach overcomes this by having different
types of recommenders present.
Collaborative ﬁltering techniques, on the other hand, match people with
similar interests and then recommend one person’s highly evaluated items
to the others [Goldberg et al. 1992; Resnick et al. 1994]. Thus, rather than
computing the similarity of items (which relies on machine analysis of content
[Herlocker et al. 2000]), collaborative ﬁltering computes the similarity of user’s
interests. This means that subjective data about items can be incorporated
into recommendations (of the content-based approach). This, in turn, facili-
tatesserendipitousnewﬁnds.Inaddition,collaborativeﬁlteringtechniquescan
be used to recommend both machine-parsable items (such as textual articles
[Terveen et al. 1997]) and non-machine-parsable ones (such as audio and video
ﬁles [Shardanand and Maes 1995; Hill et al. 1995]). Indeed, perhaps the great-
eststrengthofcollaborativetechniquesisthattheyarecompletelyindependent
of any machine-readable representations of the objects being recommended.
Thus, they work well for complex objects such as music and movies where
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variations in taste are responsible for much of the variation in preference
[Burke 2002].
Given these beneﬁts, collaborative recommenders have been developed
for many applications. For example, Ringo recommends music album and
artists based on the word-of-mouth recommendations by weighting users’
votes [Shardanand and Maes 1995], GroupLens helps people ﬁnd Usenet news
articles on a collaborative basis [Konstan et al. 1997], and MEMOIR assists
people in ﬁnding other people (rather than documents) with similar interests
[DeRoure et al. 2001]. However, collaborative ﬁltering approaches also have a
number of shortcomings. First, large numbers of people must participate so as
to increase the likelihood that any one person will ﬁnd other users with sim-
ilar interests [Terveen and Hill 2001] (the sparsity problem). The difﬁculty of
achieving a critical mass of participants makes collaborative ﬁltering experi-
ments expensive. Second, a user whose interests share little with others’ will
receive poor recommendations on a collaborative basis. An extreme case of this
phenomenon happens when new users start off with nothing in their proﬁles of
interestsandmusttrainaproﬁlefromscratch(the“coldstartproblem”[Resnick
and Varian 1997]). Even with a start proﬁle, there is still a training period be-
fore the proﬁle accurately reﬂects the user’s preferences [Maltz and Ehrlich
1995]. Third, these systems suffer from the “early-rater problem” [Montaner
et al. 2003]: when a new item appears in the database, there is no way it can
be recommended to a user until more information is obtained through another
user either rating it or specifying which other items it is similar to.
As can be seen, both content-based and collaborative ﬁltering have weak-
nesses. Moreover, these weakness tend to complement one another [Montaner
et al. 2003]. Thus, hybrid ﬁltering systems that integrate the two approaches
have been advocated [Herlocker et al. 2000]. In a hybrid system, both objec-
tive and subjective properties of an item are taken into account in predicting
its quality when making recommendations. For example, ﬁlterbots integrate
content-based ﬁltering techniques to build virtual users in the GroupLens col-
laborative system [Sarwar et al. 1998], the Fab collaborative system main-
tains user proﬁles by using content-based analysis [Balabanovic and Shoham
1997], Pazzani’s system involves user collaborations to determine the ratings
of predicted items and a content-based proﬁle to compute similarity among
users [Pazzani 1999], Popescul’s system uses secondary data (e.g., document
contents) to predict users’ preferences in collaborative recommendations when
there is a lack of user ratings [Popescul et al. 2001], and Claypoole’s system
employs separate collaborative and content-based recommenders and uses an
adaptive weighted average of the two in making its selections (as the number
of users accessing an item increases, the weight of the collaborative component
tends to increase [Claypool et al. 1999]).
While hybrid systems can sometimes overcome the shortcomings of pure
content-based and pure collaborative systems, with respect to the objective and
subjective properties of recommendations, they do so in a rigid and predeter-
mined manner. Speciﬁcally, such systems try to use one of the recommendation
properties (either objectiveness or subjectiveness) to complement the weak-
nesses of the other when the latter does not work effectively. However, there is
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no automated way of determining in what circumstances which kind of prop-
erties (objective, subjective, or both) are relevant to a particular user in their
current context. In contrast, by using the market to reward effective recom-
menders (irrespective of whether they use subjective or objective methods, or a
combination of the two), our system dynamically tunes the relative importance
of the methods according to the feedback received from the users.
The ﬁnal type of ﬁltering technique that has been used in recommender sys-
tems is demographic ﬁltering. This approach uses descriptions of people (such
as occupation, age, and gender) to learn the relationship between a single item
and the type of people who like it [Krulwich 1997]. For example, a mature, so-
phisticated woman is likely to prefer an expensive leather jacket, whereas a
teenage school girl may prefer a cheap denim one. However, this method has
two principle shortcomings. First, it creates proﬁles by classifying users using
stereotypical descriptions [Rich 1979]. Thus, the same items are recommended
topeoplewithsimilardemographicproﬁles.However,inmanycases,thestereo-
types are too general to generate good quality recommendations [Montaner
et al. 2003]. Second, if the user’s interests shift over time, demographic ﬁlter-
ing does not adapt their proﬁle [Koychev 2000]. For these reasons, demographic
ﬁltering is rarely used independently of the other ﬁltering techniques.
In terms of combining different recommendation methods using a market-
place, the most related work to our own is that of Bohte et al. [2001, 2004].
Essentially, the main purpose of that work was to provide a mechanism for
retail businesses to advertise their products. However, this was less concerned
with the information retrieval and ﬁltering. Speciﬁcally, they used a market to
competitively allocate consumers’ attention space in the domain of retailing.
Here, the scarce resource is the consumer’s ability to focus on a set of ban-
ners or products. This work developed an adaptive bidding strategy that the
agents can use to learn the consumer’s preferences. However, this work and our
own use the market mechanisms in different ways to solve the resource alloca-
tion problem in recommender systems. The market in Bohte et al. [2001] was
used only to coordinate agents’ bidding. However, our market is used not only
for this purpose, but also to coordinate the objectiveness and subjectiveness of
recommendations and to correlate various recommendation methods’ internal
valuation of qualities to the user’s actual interests.
In a somewhat related fashion, a number of Web portals and search engines,
such as Overture (www.overture.com) and Google (www.google.com), now imple-
ment market-based mechanisms to provide an advertisement service for small
businesses to meet their potential online customers. However, these mecha-
nisms are different from ours in a number of important ways. Speciﬁcally, the
marketplacesinthesesystemsareestablishedprimarilytocoordinatecurrency
transactions (between the advertisers and the Web site owners). However, our
marketplace is a means for coordinating different recommendation algorithms.
Thus, our system is an information ﬁltering system rather than an e-commerce
system. Additionally, these mechanisms are weak in personalizing their of-
ferings to the user or in responding to user feedback. Their advertisements
are typically selected based on the very general keywords of products, such as
“medical books” or “comedy movies.” But no attempt is made to identify which
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medical book or which comedy movie is appropriate for a speciﬁc user. Even
more importantly, the ranking of recommendations is not oriented to the users.
Such systems simply rank recommendations by the price that advertisers are
willing to pay. In contrast, our system (through its reward mechanism) incen-
tivizes advertisers to modify their behavior in order to make recommendations
that better ﬁt with the user’s preferences.
3. DESIGNING THE MARKETPLACE
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of the marketplace architecture
(see Section 3.1). Then, we introduce the evaluation metrics that we will use
to examine the marketplace’s properties in Section 3.2. We present a detailed
market mechanism design (including the auction protocol, the reward mech-
anism, and the bidding strategy) in Section 3.3. Finally, we analyze how the
market performs from an economic viewpoint in Section 3.4.
3.1 The Marketplace Architecture
At an abstract level, the problem of populating the limited space of the side-
bar from the large number of potential recommendations can be viewed as a
scarce resource allocation problem. Moreover, one of the best ways of allocating
scarce resources is to sell them using free market techniques [Samuelson and
Nordhaus 2001; Varian 2003]. Given this, we decided to view our recommender
system as a computational economy [Tesfatsion 2002].
More speciﬁcally, auctions are an excellent method of distributing resources
to those who value them most highly [Reynolds 1996]. Here an auction is
simply a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [McAfee
and McMillan 1987]. In a typical auction, there is an auctioneer, a seller, and
potential bidders. The auctioneer, acting on behalf of the seller, wants to sell
the item and get the highest possible price, while the bidders, employing some
biddingstrategiestoplacebids,wanttobuytheitematthelowestpossibleprice
[Vickrey 1961; Milgrom 1989; Klemperer 1999]. However, there is no universal
auction design that is applicable to every context [Roth 2002; Jennings et al.
2001]. Auctions vary from one another and these variations make the auctions
more or less efﬁcient in particular types of application. In our case, the
marketplace operates according to the following metaphor (see Figure 3).
A user browses the Web in a particular information domain and requests
recommendations from the marketplace. We assume the user does not change
his or her browsing context and his or her interests during the course of
this browsing activity. The auctioneer agent2 acting on a user’s behalf sells
2Agents are clearly identiﬁable problem-solving entities with well-deﬁned boundaries and inter-
faces. They are situated (embedded) in a particular environment over which they have partial
control and observability (receive inputs related to the state of their environment through sen-
sors and act on the environment through effectors) and they are designed to fulﬁll a speciﬁc role
[Jennings 2001]. In this article, the term agent is used speciﬁcally to represent the software agents,
not the human agents in the traditional economic sense. Thus, for example, a recommending agent
is a software entity that encapsulates a particular type of recommendation algorithm.
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Fig. 3. The marketplace architecture.
sidebar space where information may be displayed (in our case the sidebar
has M slots). Information providers are keen to get their recommendations
advertised in the user’s browser, and compete in the marketplace, ready to
pay for such advertisements. Such information providers act as bidders. Each
recommendation with a bidding price acts as one bid. The marketplace acts
as the auctioneer, ranking and selecting the most valuable items and recom-
mending them to the user. The user will then choose some of them according
to his or her interests as the next documents to be viewed. Those agents
who provided such recommendations are the winners in this auction and will
receive some reward in return (since such documents are deemed useful).
Those documents not chosen by the user are deemed to have no relevance to
the current document and will therefore receive no reward.3 Thus, over the
longer term, those agents that make good recommendations become richer and
so are able to get their recommendations advertised more frequently than the
methods whose recommendations are infrequently chosen by the user.
There are millions of different types of auctions [Wurman et al. 1998]; how-
ever, as is often the case in designing computational economies [Dash et al.
2003], none of them are exactly suited to our scenario. Speciﬁcally, while stan-
dard auctions could probably deal with the shortlisting phase, they do not con-
sider the subsequent reward phase. This means we need to design a bespoke
auction (as detailed in Section 3.3).
3.2 The Market Evaluation Metrics
Designing market mechanisms is an engineering design task,i nwhich the rules
should be developed in order to meet particular objectives, either for certain
3The credits paid by recommender agents for advertising their recommendations and the rewards
awarded to agents to encourage them to put forward good suggestions are not a real currency. Thus,
there is no business model concerned with these credits and rewards; they are used only for the
coordination of the recommender agents in our system.
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participants or for society as a whole [Roth 2002]. In seeking to design the
market mechanism for our recommender system, therefore, our ﬁrst step is to
identify the properties that we would like our auction to exhibit. This then gives
us the requirement against which we can evaluate our design. In particular we
would like to design a market that has the following standard properties [Sand-
holm 1999; Varian 2003; Dash et al. 2003]:
(1) Pareto efﬁciency. A solution x is Pareto efﬁcient if there is no other solu-
tion x  such that at least one agent is better off in x  than in x and no agent
is worse off in x  than in x.P areto efﬁciency provides us with a way of com-
paring alternative mechanisms, and good mechanisms should be designed
to maximize allocation efﬁciency [Roth 2002; Sandholm 1999; Varian 2003].
This is important from the point of view of the individual agents because
if a non-Pareto efﬁcient mechanism is chosen then the design could be im-
proved upon (for at least one agent) without making any of the other agents
worse off.
(2) Social welfare maximization. In our context, social welfare is a numeric
measure of the sum of all agents’ utilities. In contrast to Pareto efﬁciency,
social welfare provides a way to rank different social preferences over the
various solutions and to indicate which is best for the group of agents as a
whole [Kagel and Roth 1995]. This is a supplement to the Pareto efﬁcient
criterion. From the viewpoint of individual agents, there may exist many
Pareto efﬁcient solutions to the given problem that cannot be distinguished
between. In such cases, social welfare maximization provides a way of dif-
ferentiating between them by determining which is the best from the social
point of view [Sandholm 1999; Varian 2003].
(3) Individually rationality. Participation in an auction is individually ratio-
nal for an agent if its payoff in the auction is no less than what it would get
bynotparticipating.Amechanismisindividuallyrationalifparticipationis
individually rational for all agents [Sandholm 1999]. Individually rational
protocols are essential in our context because all agents (representing the
various recommendation methods) need a clear incentive to participate in
the market so that the best possible recommendations can be picked by the
market. Indeed, if the protocol is not individually rational for some agents,
they would simply not participate in the auction and their recommenda-
tions would be lost.
(4) Convergence. If the prices for the goods being allocated converge after a
number of rounds of auctions, the market is said to be convergent. This is
important from the viewpoint of the bidding agents since it enables them
to learn to bid rationally at a certain level for a given type of good (charac-
terized by UPQ level in this case) in order to maximize their revenue [Roth
2002].Withoutconvergence,anagentwillneverknowhowmuchtobidwith
respect to a given recommendation and therefore the marketplace behavior
would be chaotic.
(5) Effective shortlist in decreasing order of UPQ. This is the common aim of
all recommender systems [Herlocker et al. 2004]. The marketplace should
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be capable of shortlisting the recommendations in decreasing order of the
UPQ after a number of auction iterations. This is important from the point
of view of the users since they only want a small number of the best
recommendations.
(6) Clear incentives. A good mechanism design should give agents incentives
to act in particular way, such that the system’s global goals is attained de-
spite the individual goals of the self-interested agents [Dash et al. 2003;
Sandholm 1999]. In our context, the protocol should be able to incentivize
the recommending agents about the user’s interests so that they can bid dif-
ferently for different INQ levels. This is important because a recommender
agent needs to relate its bids to the internal quality of the recommenda-
tions through the feedback from the marketplace which reﬂects the user’s
preferences.
(7) Stability. A protocol is stable if it provides all agents with an incentive to
behave in a particular way over time. The marketplace should be designed
to be stable because, if a self-interested agent is better off behaving in
some other manner than desired, it will do so [Sandholm 1999]. Thus, an
unstable protocol allows agents to behave with intentions that make the
system deviate from the its best potential outcome [Roth 2002]. Therefore,
stability is important because without it the system behavior is unpredic-
table.
(8) Fairness. A good market mechanism should be fair to all partici-
pants [Roth 2002; Dash et al. 2003]. In our context, a protocol is fair if
it gives all recommendations equal opportunity of being shortlisted (irre-
spective of the agent or method that generates them). This is important
because we want the system to shortlist the best recommendations in an
unbiased manner.
The ﬁrst three points of the above criteria are set from a pure economic point
of view and, therefore, the marketplace can be evaluated against these metrics
at design time. The remaining ﬁve items relate to the quality of the system’s
outputandcanonlybeevaluatedbyexperiments.Hence,theevaluationagainst
the former metrics are discussed when analyzing the market equilibrium in
Section3.4,whereastheevaluationsagainstthelattermetricswillbediscussed
in Section 4.
3.3 The Market Mechanism Design
With the evaluation metrics in place, Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3, respec-
tively, detail the auction protocol we designed, the reward mechanism we es-
tablished, and the bidding strategies of the individual agents. Section 3.4 then
analyzes how the market performs with such a market mechanism and the
corresponding bidding strategies in place.
3.3.1 TheA uction Protocol. This section deﬁnes the auction protocol for
managing the multiple recommending agents (as per Figure 4). To ensure rec-
ommendations are provided in a timely and computationally efﬁcient manner,
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Fig. 4. The auction protocol.
we choose a generalized ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction in which all agents whose
recommendations are shortlisted pay an amount equal to their valuation of the
advertisement (meaning we have price differentiation5). We choose a sealed-bid
4We assumethenumberofrecommendersmakesthenumberofrecommendationssufﬁcientlylarge
with respect to the number of sidebar slots such that there is sufﬁcient competition to make the
marketplace operate efﬁciently.
5If there is more than one item to be sold, the items can all be sold at the same price (called price
uniformity)o rthey may be sold at different prices (called price differentiation). In this work, we
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auction (in which agents will typically make a single bid) to minimize the time
forrunningtheauctionandtheamountofcommunicationgenerated.Wechoose
a ﬁrst-price auction with price differentiation because the relative ordering of
the recommendations effects the likelihood of them being selected by the user.
In particular, in the market, each information provider agent is keen to get its
recommendations advertised to the user. Each agent has a valuation of the rec-
ommendation (which will be different for the different agents) and is willing to
pay up to this amount to display its recommendations. When an agent gets its
recommendations shortlisted, and therefore advertised to the user’s browser,
it has consumed the advertisement service provided by the recommender sys-
tem. In return, it needs to pay an amount of credit (at the bidding price) to the
system for each of its shortlisted items.
In more detail, the market operates in the following manner. Each time the
user browses a new page, the auction is activated. In each such activation, the
auctioneer agent calls for a number of bids (M which equals to the number
of recommendations being sought). Then each bidding agent submits M bids.
Afteraﬁxedtime,theauctioneeragentranksallthebidsitreceivedbytheirbid-
ding price, and directs the M bids with the highest prices to the user’s browser
sidebar (as shortlisted recommendations). Those bidding agents whose recom-
mendations are shortlisted pay the auctioneer agent according to how much
they bid. Those bidding agents whose recommendations are not shortlisted do
not pay anything. The user may then follow up a number of the shortlisted
recommendations, in which case the agent that supplied them is rewarded. In
the case where multiple shortlisted recommendations use the same document
and only one of them is selected by the user, all of them will be rewarded the
same amount.
More formally, the protocol for each auction round is deﬁned in Figure 4.
It should be noted that: (i) function GenerateBid (Abi,recj, price j) relates
to the bidding strategy and will be discussed in Section 3.3.3; (ii) function
UserSelectsRecs(SU) concerns the user’s behavior of making choices among
the shortlisted recommendations and will be discussed in Section 4.1.3; and
(iii) function ComputeReward(bh) concerns the reward mechanism and will be
discussed in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2 The Reward Mechanism. With the auction protocol in place, we now
turn to the reward mechanism. According to our protocol, the user may se-
lect multiple recommendations from the shortlist. For each such user-selected
recommendation, the suggesting agent is given a reward. In deﬁning the
ComputeReward function, our aim is to ensure that it is both Pareto efﬁcient
and social welfare maximizing (as per Section 3.2).
Since the global objective is to shortlist the most valuable recommendations
in decreasing order of user perceived quality,w edecided to reward the user-
selected recommendations purely based on the UPQ (not INQ). The UPQs can be
deﬁnedas Qh (h ∈ [1···N]and Qh isapositivenaturalnumberthatrepresents
exploit price differentiation because it differentiates recommendations so as to display them at
different advertisement slots and it allows a seller to obtain the maximum possible proﬁt [Varian
2003, pp.439–441.],
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a user’s ratings or preferences of the interesting recommendations). In practice,
however, all user-selected recommendations are ordered in decreasing rank of
UPQ such that Q1  Q2  ··· Q N. Thus, Qh denotes the hth rewarded recom-
mendation (user-selected recommendation with the hth highest UPQ). To ensure
different quality recommendations’ bidding prices converge to different levels
(so that our marketplace is able to differentiate recommendation qualities), we
involved two other variables: Ph (h ∈ [1···N]) and P∗
m (m ∈ [1···M]). The
former is the bidding price of the hth rewarded recommendation. The latter
is the historical average bidding price of the mth shortlisted recommendation
during the system’s lifetime (note the bidding agents do not actually know this
value). By this deﬁnition, P∗
m indicates the price for the mth advertisement dis-
played in the user’s browser sidebar which is decided by the “invisible hand”
(namely the market). With this information, we can deﬁne the reward to the
hth rewarded recommendation as
Rh = δ · Qh · PM+1 − α ·|P∗
h − Ph|, (1)
where δ and α are two system coefﬁcients (δ>0 and α>1) and PM+1 is the
highest not shortlisted bid price (the detailed justiﬁcation for this particular
choice is given in Wei et al. [2003b]). The values of δ and α will depend upon
the speciﬁcs of the application (see Section 4.1.1 for details), but they need to
be set at suitable values to ensure Rh > Ph so that the rewarded agents can
make proﬁts. We based the reward on PM+1 (whose value is not known by the
bidding agents) so that the market cannot easily be manipulated by the par-
ticipants [Varian 2003, page 289]. This approach also reduces the possibility of
bidding collusions because the reward is based on something that the rewarded
agents are unaware of and cannot control.
3.3.3 Designing the Agents’ Bidding Strategies. In our marketplace, three
kinds of information are revealed to a bidder with regards to a speciﬁc recom-
mendation: (i) this recommendation’s INQ, (ii) this bidder’s last bid price (Plast),
and (iii) the previous rewards to this recommendation (a bidder actually knows
the second piece of information). With this information, a rational bidder seeks
to maximize its revenue by bidding sensibly for recommendations based on its
knowledge of previous outcomes. Such bids can result in one of the following
outcomes occurring: the bid is not shortlisted, it is shortlisted but not rewarded,
or it is rewarded. With respect to a given INQ level, a bidder’s strategy depends
on the last outcome in the following way (again see Wei et al. [2003b] for a
justiﬁcation for these choices):
—Bid not shortlisted. The only way to increase revenue is to get the recommen-
dation shortlisted. Therefore, the agent will increase its bidding price:
Pnext = Y · Plast (Y > 1).
—Bid shortlisted but not rewarded. This means the agent overrated its INQ with
respect to the UPQ and so the agent should decrease its price in subsequent
rounds so as to lose less:
Pnext = Z · Plast (0 < Z < 1).
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Table I. Price Adjustment and Results
Current price Adjustment |P∗
h − Ph|  ξ
Ph < P∗
h
+ P   > 0
− P   < 0
Ph > P∗
h
+ P   < 0
− P   > 0
—Bid rewarded. These agents have a good correlation between their INQ for a
recommendation and that of the UPQ. Therefore, these agents have a chance
of increasing their revenue. The proﬁt made by the hth rewarded recommen-
dation is
ξh = δ · Qh · PM+1 − α ·|P∗
h − Ph|−Ph.
However, the agent is unaware of P∗
h (as per Section 3.3.2), so in practice it does
not know whether ξh has been maximized. Hence, it must minimize (α ·|P∗
h −
Ph|+Ph)s oa st omaximize ξh. Furthermore, the agent does not know whether
Ph is higher or lower than P∗
h.I neither case, however, the agent will deﬁnitely
make a loss if Ph is not close to P∗
h. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the hth rewarded
agent can always be aware of whether its price is closer to or farther from the
hth historical average market price, P∗
h,b yadjusting its bidding prices (see Wei
et al. [2003b] for the formal proof).
We have previously proved that a rational rewarded bidder will adjust its
price in order to the corresponding average market price to maximize its
proﬁt [Wei et al. 2003b]. Therefore, a rewarded agent’s practical strategy with
respect to certain rewarded recommendations is to bid in the following man-
ner: whatever its current price is with respect to the historical average, when
adjusting the bid price, if the adjustment results in making less proﬁt, it in-
dicates the action is wrong and (Ph ±  P)i sfarther from P∗
h;i fi tresults in
making more proﬁt, it indicates the action is right and (Ph± P)i sc loser to P∗
h
(see Wei et al. [2003b] for more details). This phenomenon is listed in Table I
( ξ represents the possible proﬁt of the next bid compared to that of the current
bid). In fact, Table I speciﬁes the strategy for the rewarded agents: chasing the
corresponding historical average market price. The actual value of  P will be
deﬁned in an application-speciﬁc manner.
3.4 The Market Equilibrium and Economic Justiﬁcations
According to the strategy for rewarded bidders (Section 3.3.3), such bidders
must bid in a manner that aligns their internal view of quality with that of
the user. Thus, over time, each individual recommending agent improves its
correspondence between its bid price and the user’s preferences for recommen-
dations. Only by achieving this can an agent maximize its proﬁt. However, how
quickly this convergence occurs depends on the adjustment of price  P.
In the short term, assuming that the set of recommending agents remains
unchanged between successive auctions and they produce recommendations of
the same quality level, we can show that the market reaches an equilibrium.
The hth historical average market price reﬂects the market equilibrium price:
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Fig. 5. Market Equilibrium and Its Change. ((a) The supply curve S is vertical, indicating that
whatever the deal is, the supply of the hth advertisement slot is constant. The demand curve D
has a slope indicating that more agents are willing to pay a low price and few agents are willing
to pay a high price for the same slot. The cross indicates that at a certain price level the quantity
of demand equals that of supply. This cross point represents the market equilibrium. (b) At each
price level, more recommendations become available and the demand curve shifts to the right.)
thus, at a certain price, the quantity of demand of the hth advertisement slot
equals the quantity of the supply (see Figure 5(a)6).
Inthelongrun,however,theseassumptionswillnotholdandtheequilibrium
will tend to be broken. However, this new market situation will gradually tend
toward another equilibrium and will reach it as long as the changes in the
recommending agents are not too frequent with respect to convergence times
(see Figure 5(b)). If, for example, there is more demand in the system, the
demand curve will shift right compared to Figure 5(a). This means that, at each
price level, there are more bidders willing to pay for the same advertisement
slot (because, for example, more better recommendations are being produced).
Atequilibrium,sincethebiddingpricesarealignedwiththe UPQs, thesystem
will produce a shortlist of recommendations in decreasing order of UPQ (see Wei
et al. [2003b] for the proof), which is precisely the objective of the recommender
system. Moreover at this point, our reward mechanism (see Formula (1)) ex-
hibits Pareto efﬁciency and social welfare maximization for the recommending
agents. Here, we brieﬂy sketch how the mechanism achieves these two proper-
ties (see Wei et al. [2003b] for full details and proofs). With our reward mech-
anism, the historical average market price, P∗
h, reﬂects how the majority of
bidders value a given advertisement slot and this price becomes the expected
equilibrium price. This incentivizes each bidder to iterate itself to the corre-
sponding expected equilibrium price. Therefore, the market has a tendency to
converge to equilibrium. With the market tending to equilibrium, the second
term in Formula (1) tends to zero. Therefore, this mechanism is equivalent to
rewarding agents proportionally to their user-selected recommendations’ UPQs,
which is precisely what we want to achieve.
6Strictly speaking, the demand curve should be discrete in this case. And the quantity of supply is
1 since we differentiate between each of the M slots and there is only one hth slot. To simplify the
discussion, however, we use a continuous demand curve in this context.
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Additionally, with the market tending to equilibrium, the bidding strategies
outlined in Section 3.3.3 are dominant (the best thing to do, irrespective of
the actions of any other agents) and so will be adopted by the designers of all
rational recommending agents.
4. EVALUATING THE MARKETPLACE
This section reports on the simulation experiments to evaluate the market
mechanisms designed for our recommender system in Section 3 with respect
to the last ﬁve criteria described in Section 3.2. The experimental settings are
discussed in Section 4.1. The evaluations of the marketplace are then presented
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 evaluates the market properties and the correlation
between the UPQ and the INQ in more general cases when multiple features
of recommendations are considered. Section 4.4 evaluates the system’s ability
to seek out the recommendation with the highest UPQ value from all bids and
recommend it to the user.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Our system is composed of three kinds of agents: the auctioneer agent, the
recommending agents, and the user agent (as per Figure 3) (discussed, respec-
tively, in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). Before we discuss these agents, how-
ever, an important system variable, the number of bids called for, M (deﬁned
in Section 3.3.1), needs to be decided. Here we use the value of 10 (because
our previous study showed this is the number of items that can be managed
efﬁciently in the browser’s sidebar [Moreau et al. 2002]).
4.1.1 Conﬁguring the Auctioneer Agent. The auctioneer agent determines
the reward paid to the agents who make recommendations selected by the
user. Given that the rewarded mechanism is deﬁned in Formula (1), two sys-
tem variables control the auctioneer agent: δ and α (deﬁned in Section 3.3.2).
From the reward mechanism, we can see that δ affects the volume of the
credit paid to a particular user-selected recommendation. The bigger δ is, the
more the recommendation is paid. We can also see that α affects the sensi-
tivity of the incentives the marketplace delivers to the recommending agents
to make them aware of the equilibrium (because the recommending agents
need large alterations to chase the equilibrium price if α is big). In our exper-
iment, we set δ = 1.5 and α = 1.5 (based on our experience that these values
enable the recommending agents to both increase their revenue by making
good recommendations over the long term and chase the equilibrium quickly
[Wei et al. 2003a]).
4.1.2 Conﬁguring the Recommending Agents. In this subsection, we dis-
cuss how a recommending agent generates a bid and how it relates the bid-
ding price to its INQ for a recommendation. Before delving into this discussion,
however, the number of recommending agents contained in our system needs
to be deﬁned. We assign this system variable (see S deﬁned in Figure 4) a
value of 9 (to ensure there is a sufﬁcient number of input recommendations
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and sufﬁcient competition in the marketplace). This value is not chosen for ex-
perimental expediency and, in practice, it would depend on how many actual
bidding agents participate in the marketplace.
Each agent has a set of recommendations available to suggest (typically
ordered according to their INQs). Each such agent needs to compute the relation
between its local perception of relevance and the user’s preference. Having done
this, it can then bid an appropriate price to maximize its revenue. Thus, the
agent will relate its bidding price to its knowledge about the UPQ (reﬂected
by the rewards it has received) with respect to different INQ levels. We term
this relationship between the bidding price and the INQ an agent’s strategy
proﬁle. This proﬁle is on a per agent basis. It records an agent’s bidding price
for different INQ levels and indicates how an agent should relate its bid to its
INQ.
4.1.2.1 Simulating Recommendation Methods. To assess the broad feasi-
bility of our market-based approach, we want our representation of the INQst o
be capable of corresponding to as many recommendation techniques as possi-
ble. Moreover, we do not want our results to be skewed by any innate bias in
the recommendation methods themselves. Therefore, we take an abstract view
on the recommender methods and view them simply as being able to learn a
user’s interests based on their internal belief about certain recommendation
properties (features or attributes) that the user’s context focuses on. We believe
this is a reasonable abstraction because a recommendation method’s ability
to adaptively match certain recommendation properties to the user’s actual
preferences has been shown to be crucial to making high-quality recommen-
dations [Claypool et al. 1999]. Given these observations, we deﬁne the INQ of
a speciﬁc recommendation method to be the sum of the weighted evaluation
scores made of different techniques on different properties of a recommenda-
tion (see Equation (2)). This is consistent with the observation that effective
recommendation methods need to combine ﬁltering techniques based on dif-
ferent recommendation properties to achieve peak performance [Burke 2002].
To this end, we simulate the recommendation methods’ INQso nalinear basis.7
More formally,
q(Rec) = k1 ·  1(Rec) + k2 ·  2(Rec) +···+kI ·  I(Rec)( I > 0), (2)
where q(Rec) represents the INQ of item Rec based on a speciﬁc method. This
method evaluates an item from I perspectives (i.e., properties, features, or
attributes). The value of I is on a per method basis because different meth-
ods evaluate different numbers of properties of an item. Here, each  i(Rec)
(i ∈ [1···I]) represents the evaluation score based on a speciﬁc property of
7This linear combination is used by several hybrid recommender systems in combining results from
different recommendation methods [Claypool et al. 1999; Pazzani 1999; Littlestone and Warmuth
1994]. Through combining different weighted properties or features, it is believed that a recom-
mendation method can improve its precision in predicting the user’s preference and improve its
quality of recommendations [Pazzani 1999; Yu et al. 2003].
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Rec ( i(Rec) ∈ [0, 1.0]).8 Such properties can be either objective (such as the
TFIDF [Salton 1989] of a document), subjective (such as customers’ opinions of
the tastes of the foods in a restaurant) or a mixture of the two (such as users’
opinions of the textual and graphical descriptions of the products of a store).
Variable ki (ki > 0) speciﬁes the weight of  i(Rec) and k1 + k2 + ···+kI = 1.0
in order to ensure 0  q  1.0.
For example, consider the case where the user’s browsing context is local
restaurants. In this situation, an individual recommendation method might
base its INQ on the TFIDF of an online restaurant menu with a value between
0t o1.0, other people’s opinions of the food on the restaurant’s Web Site with
an integer voting value of 1···5 (normalization will be used), whether the user
has ever consumed the service of the current restaurant with a binary value of
0o r1 ,o rany other possible properties of the item. In our case, each of these
corresponds to a speciﬁc  i(Rec) and if a particular method uses a combination
of these base terms then appropriate values for the respective ki’s would be set.
The next step is to determine how to simulate  . Based on our previous stud-
ies in this area, by randomly collecting 400 different Web pages on the subject of
“world news,” we found that the keyword similarity [Moreau et al. 2002] of the
400 documents compared to CNN’s frontpage (www.cnn.com) follows a Gaussian
normal distribution (see the contour of the distribution in Figure 6(a)). Hence,
we decided to use some Gaussian normal distributions to model the properties
( )o frecommendations in predicting user’s preferences on a probabilistic ba-
sis [Popescul et al. 2001; Sharma and Poole 2001]. Speciﬁcally, in our experi-
ments, we simulated different document properties of one method by different
random variables that follow different normal distributions. The probability
density function of the normal distribution is deﬁned as9:
N(µ, σ2): f (q) =
1
√
2πσ
e
−
(q−µ)2
2σ2 , q ∈ [0, 1.0], (3)
where µ and σ are the mean value and the standard deviation of the random
samples (see Figure 6(b)). The mean of the distribution represents the average
value of the INQso fall samples generated by the corresponding method. The
middlerange(betweenoneunitofstandarddeviationonbothsidesofthemean)
of the distribution contains the majority of the samples (about 68% of its total).
One of the key objectives of the recommending agents is to build up their
strategy proﬁles so that they can relate their bidding price to their INQs based
on their knowledge about the reward (which, in turn, reﬂects the UPQ of the
recommendations). In order to learn such characteristics for all INQ levels, each
agent divides its strategy proﬁle into 20 continuous segments. In each auction,
8Whenevaluatingdifferentrecommendationmethods,weperformanormalizationontheresultsto
ﬁx them into a range of [0, 1.0]. This is because different recommendation methods have different
quality (or rating) ranges [Pennock et al. 2000]. This can be achieved in practice by adaptively
matching a method’s min and max INQ value onto 0 and 1.0, respectively. This makes the values
from different methods meaningful in our market based recommender system in terms of INQ and
UPQ.
9We ﬁx the sample into the range [0, 1.0] (rather than (−∞, +∞)) since we have manipulated the
INQ into this range (see Equation (2)).
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Fig. 6. Simulating evaluation technique.
a recommending agent needs to compute the INQso ften recommendations and
make10correspondingbids.Intheearlyauctionrounds,alltheagents’strategy
proﬁles are empty. With an empty strategy proﬁle, an agent will bid proportion-
ally (because it can only expect a high INQ recommendation to receive a high UPQ
and, consequently, more reward than a low INQ recommendation) to the INQ of 10
(value of M deﬁned in Section 3.3.1) recommendations based on an initial seed-
ingprice.Wesetdifferentinitialseedingpricevalues(randomlygeneratedfrom
the range [128, 256]10) for different recommending agents (because different
agents value their recommendations differently with their empty strategy pro-
ﬁles). After each auction, all strategy proﬁle segments record and update infor-
mation about the last bid status (not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded,
or rewarded), the last bid price, the last rewarded price, and the last rewarded
proﬁt. Based on such information about each segment, and using the appropri-
ate bidding strategy, an agent can compute its bids in subsequent auctions if
there are recommendations that belong to this segment. After a number of it-
erations, those segments that cover the majority of samples will have sufﬁcient
information to reach the equilibrium price and form a stable strategy proﬁle.
4.1.3 Conﬁguring the User Agent. Again in seeking to evaluate the prin-
ciple of a market-based approach to recommendation, we want to work in a
10The exact values of the boundary of the range are not important. What matters is whether such
a randomly given range can make the market converge and exhibit the other properties speciﬁed
in Section 3.2.
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Table II. User’s Decision of Different Modelsa
Shortlisted recommendations Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
User perceived quality 70 50 75 30 60 82 90 85 65 55
Decision of independent selection 1010111110
Decision of search-till-satisﬁed 1010110000
aBoth models have the same AT of 60. Search-till-satisﬁed model has a ST of 80. “1” means the recommendation
is selected to be rewarded, while “0” means not selected.
well-controlled environment. Thus we simulate the users of our recommender
system (as others have done when seeking to validate the principle of a new
method [Billsus and Pazzani 2000; Bohte et al. 2004; Gonzalez et al. 2004]).
Speciﬁcally, when a user is faced with a set of shortlisted recommendations,
she or he will visit some of the recommendations and will then have a valua-
tion of each visited item. Thus, a user assigns a number, Qi (Qi ∈ [0···100],
i ∈ [1···M]), to each visited item according to her or his valuation of the rec-
ommendation. This number Qi is the UPQ value. To simulate the choices of a
user in selecting recommendations, we deployed a user model inside the user
agent. Building on the user simulation of [Bohte et al. 2001], we adopted the
following models:
—Independent selection. The selection of one recommendation is independent
of the others. Once the UPQ of a recommendation is greater than or equal to
a particular acceptance threshold (AT), the recommendation is accepted and
rewarded. Those recommendations with UPQ less than AT will not be selected
and therefore receive no reward.
—Search-till-satisﬁed Behavior. The selection of one recommendation is depen-
dent on other recommendations that are ranked above it in the list. In this
case, the user stops searching once he or she discovers a recommendation
that has a UPQ greater than or equal to a particular satisfaction threshold
(ST).
By means of an illustration, Table II is an example of a user’s decision under
the two different models. All recommendations with UPQ above the AT (60)
are selected to be rewarded in the case of independent selection. However,
Q7, Q8, and Q9 are not selected to be rewarded by the search-till-satisﬁed
behavior though their UPQs are above the AT. Indeed, the user stops search-
ing since a document with a quality of 82 (Q6) has been found above the ST
(80).
We simulate the user by a user agent which knows its valuation for each
recommendation and assigns the UPQ based on this valuation correspondingly.
Thus, when a real user considers I  (I  > 0) properties of a recommendation
(Rec), the UPQ of Rec is deﬁned as
Q(Rec) = k 
1 ·   
1(Rec) + k 
2 ·   
2(Rec) +···+k 
I  ·   
I (Rec), (4)
where   
i(Rec) (whose deﬁnition is equivalent to that of  i(Rec)i nEquation (2),
  
i(Rec) ∈ [0, 1.0], i ∈ [1···I ]) is the valuation of one of the properties of Rec.
k 
i (k 
i > 0, i ∈ [1···I ]) is the weight of   
i(Rec) contributing to Q(Rec). We set
k 
1 + k 
2 +···+k 
I  = 100 to ensure 0  Q  100.
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4.1.4 Correlating the UPQ to the INQ. From the formal speciﬁcations of the
UPQ and the INQ of a given item, as given in Equations (2) and (4), it can be
seen whether the properties of the document that the user considers overlap
with those that a recommendation method considers. Here, we deﬁne the set of
properties {  
1,   
2, ...,   
I } that the user evaluates as ϕQ. Likewise, we deﬁne
the set of properties { 1,  2, ...,  I} that a recommendation method evaluates
as ϕq.W edeﬁne ϕ = ϕQ ∩ ϕq as the recommendation method’s effective factors
in terms of the UPQ.W edeﬁne ϕ = ϕQ − ϕq as the recommendation method’s
ineffective factors. The variable ϕ is important, because if ϕ  = Ø( Østands for
“empty set”) the method will have some correlation with the UPQ since their
evaluations of the recommendation items share some of the same properties.
Otherwise, if ϕ = Ø, a recommendation method cannot correlate its INQ to the
UPQ since they evaluate the items from totally different perspectives.11 These
issues will be discussed in detail in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
By abstracting all recommendation methods as independent learners that
predict user’s preferences, all predictions can be seen as composed of effective
data and noisy data on a probabilistic basis [Popescul et al. 2001; Sharma and
Poole 2001]. This, in turn, simpliﬁes modeling the market-based component
recommenders on a high abstraction level. Speciﬁcally, by deﬁning a recom-
mendation method’s effective and ineffective factors, given a recommendation
item Rec, its UPQ can be represented in terms of a method’s INQ as follows:
Q(Rec) =  (ϕ(Rec)) +  (ϕ(Rec)), (5)
where   and   are two mapping functions that align the coefﬁcients of the
elements of ϕ and ϕ with the weightings (k 
i)o fthe properties (  
i)o fQ (see
Equation (4)). For example, assume a user evaluates an item Rec from per-
spectives of  a,  b, and  c and the importance of these properties are k 
a,
k 
b, and k 
c, respectively (k 
a + k 
b + k 
c = 100 and k 
a, k 
b, k 
c > 0), the UPQ will
be Q = k 
a a + k 
b b + k 
c c. Assuming a recommendation method evaluates
the item from perspectives of  a,  b, and  d and their relative importance is
ka, kb, and kd, respectively (ka, kb, kd > 0 and ka + kb + kd = 1.0), its INQ is
q = ka a + kb b + kd d. Thus, the INQ’s effective factors are ϕ ={  a,  b} and
its ineffective factor is ϕ ={  c}. Therefore,  ( a,  b)=(
k 
a
ka
k 
b
kb) × (k )a  akb b
and  ( c)=( k 
c) × ( c). We ﬁnd that when a recommendation method’s effec-
tive factors form a major weighting of both its INQ and the UPQ (e . g ., in the
above example,  a and  b contribute
ka+kb
ka+kb+kd of the weighting of the INQ and
k 
a+k 
b
k 
a+k 
b+k 
c of the weighting of the UPQ), this method can easily correlate its INQ to
the UPQ (see Section 4.3 for more details), and can continuously produce good
recommendations and make proﬁts. Otherwise, if a method has only ineffective
11We assume that one property ( i)i stotally independent of another ( j)i fi  = j. This means any
two different properties of a recommendation do not have a relationship to one another. However,
this is not limiting because we have deﬁned the UPQ and the INQ as a linear combination of some
property values. Thus, in cases where the two properties do depend on each other, one of them can
be decomposed into two subproperties, with one subproperty the same as the other property and
the other subproperty independent of the former. However, we will not discuss this case here since
it is not our main concern.
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factors, the method cannot correlate its INQ to the UPQ and therefore makes poor
recommendations most of the time and will go bankrupt. These properties will
be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.
4.2 Evaluation of the Marketplace
Having outlined the setup of the three kinds of agents speciﬁed in Section 4.1,
this section will focus on evaluating the system properties. In our case, the mar-
ket is the key to coordinating the various recommendation methods. If it does
not work effectively, the system will not be able to make good recommendations.
Among the ﬁve properties we want our market to exhibit, convergence is the
most important because it forms the basis of the other four. Therefore, we will
start with experiments on market convergence.
4.2.1 Market Convergence.12 We endow our system with 100 documents
ready to be recommended to the user. Every time the user visits a speciﬁc rec-
ommendation, the UPQ of this recommendation is assigned by the user and this
value is independent of the various methods’ INQs. To simplify the experiments
on evaluating the properties ( i)o farecommendation item, we assume each
recommendation method evaluates items from only one property (but two dif-
ferent methods may use different properties). The more general case with more
than one  i involved in each method is dealt with in Section 4.3. We further
assume the user considers two different properties of the recommendations ( 0
and 1).Thus,theeffectiveandineffectivefactorsoftherecommendationmeth-
ods can be easily controlled.13 Assuming the weighting of the two properties are
k0 and k1, respectively, the UPQ can be represented formally as
Q(Rec) = k0 ·  0(Rec) + k1 ·  1(Rec). (6)
To generalizetheexperiments,ninecomponentrecommenderagentsareplaced
inourmarketplaceandeachofthemisbasedononeofthreedifferentproperties
( 1,  2,  3)o frecommendations (note here  1 is the same as in Equation (6)),
meaningthatsomeoftherecommendationmethodscontaintheeffectivefactors
in terms of the UPQ and some of them do not. We will use three Gaussian normal
distribution functions (see Equation (3)) to simulate the valuations of the three
properties.Eachpropertyrelatestooneofthethreedistributions: N(0.35, 0.12),
N(0.5, 0.12), and N(0.65, 0.12) (see Figure 7). We set the standard deviation
to a value of 0.1, meaning the three different properties share only a small
intersection (so as to easily differentiate the different methods). Thus, those
12The working scenario and the conﬁgurations of the UPQ and the INQ in this section will be used
for all experiments in Section 4.2
13We can exemplify this case in a scenario where the user is browsing the local restaurants on the
Web. We assume the user evaluates the recommended restaurant Web sites from two perspectives:
whether the restaurant sells some speciﬁc foods ( 0) and other customers’ opinions of the foods in
the restaurant ( 1). If a recommendation method also computes  1, then  1 is its effective factor
and  0 is its ineffective factor in terms of the UPQ (mutatis mutandis if the method computes  0). If
a recommendation method evaluates the recommendations by  x (which is different from  1 and
 0), then it has no effective factors.
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Fig. 7. Distributions of three properties of a set of recommendations.
Table III. Conﬁgurations of the Three Groups of Experiments
Experiments Conﬁgurations
Experiment 1
qi(Rec) =  1(Rec)( i ∈ [1···3]) and qj(Rec) =  2(Rec)(j ∈ [4..6])
and qk(Rec) =  3(Rec)( k ∈ [7···9])
Experiment 2 qi(Rec) =  1(Rec)( i ∈ [1···9])
Experiment 3
q1(Rec) =  1(Rec) and and qj(Rec) =  2(Rec)(j ∈ [2..5])
and qk(Rec) =  3(Rec)( k ∈ [6..9])
methods’ INQs based on  1 can be presented formally as
qi(Rec) =  1(Rec)( i ∈ [1..3]). (7)
In this case, the UPQ (Equation (6)) can be represented in terms of the INQ which
contains the effective factors
Q(Rec) = k1 · qi(Rec) + k0 ·  0(Rec)( i ∈ [1···3]). (8)
Having further conﬁgured the experimental settings, we are going to exam-
ine the system property from the perspective of market convergence. In Sec-
tion3.4,weshowedthatthemarketplacecanreachanequilibriumsuchthatthe
shortlist prices converge at different levels with respect to different UPQ levels.
To evaluate this, we arranged 300 auctions with 10 shortlisted recommenda-
tions using the independent selection user model (AT = 66) and (k1 = 75,
k0 = 25)14 for Equations (6) and (8) to see if the marketplace does indeed have
such a convergence property. We organized three groups of experiments, each of
which contains a different number of agents having the effective factors, to see
whether the market converges in various cases. The conﬁgurations are shown
in Table III.
Intheﬁrstexperiment,eachofthethreepropertiesissharedbythreeagents;
thus only the ﬁrst three agents contain the effective factor, whereas the other
six do not.15 From Figure 8(a), we can see that the shortlisted prices converge
14k1 and k0 can be set to any other combinations in these experiments. 75 and 25 are chosen to
exhibit the higher importance of  1 over  0.
15In this case, the ﬁrst three agents can relate their bidding price to their INQs, since their INQs
have a relationship with the UPQ (contributing 75% of its total weighting; See Equation (8)). Also
the rewards they received reﬂect the UPQ with respect to a speciﬁc recommendation. The remaining
six agents cannot relate their bids to their INQs because their INQsh aven orelationship with the
UPQ and their rewards. This subject will be discussed further in Section 4.2.3.
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Fig. 8. Convergence of shortlist prices.
(for example, the 4th and 10th bids oscillate around 150 and 130, respectively,
which indicate P∗
4 and P∗
10, respectively) after about 100 auctions. We ﬁnd that,
with the search-till-satisﬁed user model (with ST = 60 and AT = 45), the
market also converges (for which we do not provide a ﬁgure), but only after a
longer time (more auction rounds) compared to the independent selection. This
takeslongerbecausefeweragentsarerewardedinthiscaseandtheyneedmore
bids to chase the equilibrium price.
Inthesecondexperiment,allnineagentsevaluaterecommendationsbyprop-
erty 1.Inthiscase,themarketconvergesveryquickly(afterabout30auctions;
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see Figure 8(b)), because all agents’ INQs are actually the effective factors in
terms of the UPQ. Thus they have a good correlation with the user’s valuation of
the recommendations. Therefore, more recommendations at each quality level
can be related to the UPQ and the agents receive more signals of the user’s in-
terests. This, in turn, means agents get sufﬁcient chances to alter their price
effectively to chase the equilibrium price with respect to each UPQ level. This
results in a market that converges quickly.
In the third experiment, only the ﬁrst agent evaluates  1 and the other eight
agents evaluate  2 or  3. The market still converges but very slowly (after
about 600 auctions; see Figure 8(c)), with the ﬁrst bid price oscillating around
125. This slow speed can be accounted for by the fact that only one agent can
relate its good recommendations’ bidding price to its INQ with respect to each
UPQlevelandthereareinsufﬁcientgoodrecommendations.Therefore,theagent
needs a longer time to get a sufﬁcient number of high-quality recommendations
to be rewarded and to chase the equilibrium price. In this experiment with very
few agents taking the effective factor in terms of UPQ,i ti sinteresting to see that
the 10th bid price decreases till it reaches zero (see Figure 8(c)).16 The expla-
nation is that most of the recommendations, from the eight agents with only
ineffective factors as their INQs, cannot relate their bidding prices to their INQs.
Thus, these agents cannot reason about the relationship between the rewards
and the INQso fthe rewarded recommendations (since the rewards are based
on the UPQ, not on the INQ). Therefore, the equilibrium price for such bids (if it
exists) has no relationship with the INQ. Such a recommending agent cannot
chase the equilibrium price based on the INQ. Such shortlisted (both rewarded
and not rewarded) recommendations will make negative proﬁt most of the time.
Hence, most of the recommendations will bid as low as possible to reduce their
loss (this phenomenon continues till the bid prices reach zero, meaning paying
nothing). The exception to this is the small number of bids from the only agent
with effective factors. Overall, this experiment demonstrates that the market-
place deters bad recommendations and only good recommendations can pass
through.
When all the experiments are taken together, we ﬁnd that the shortlisted
prices always converge after a number of iterations as long as there is at least
one agent that has effective factors. The speed of the convergence depends on
the setting of the parameters α, AT, ST, Y , and Z. Since these variables are
not our main concern here, we only supply an overview of their effects. Broadly
speaking, AT and ST affect the number of recommendations being rewarded
(becausemoreagentsarerewardediftheirvaluesaresmall).Bybeingrewarded
more times, an agent receives more information and therefore can chase the
equilibrium faster. The variables Y and Z also affect the speed with which
the agent can chase the equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, with high values of these
variables, an agent alters its price quickly to reach the equilibrium price.
16Actually only the ﬁrst and second bid prices converge in this experiment. The second bid is
not plotted in Figure 8(c) because it is close to the ﬁrst bid and we want to clearly display the
convergence. The other eight bids, the 3rd ∼ 10th, do not converge and decrease continuously till
reaching zero (for the same reason only the 10th bid is plotted).
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Fig. 9. The UPQ of shortlisted recommendations (Experiment 1).
4.2.2 Efﬁcient Shortlists. The most important feature of our system is its
capability of shortlisting the best recommendations in decreasing order of UPQ
when the market converges. To this end, Figure 9(a) shows the UPQ of the short-
listed recommendations during the 100th auction (which is after convergence)
in the ﬁrst experiment introduced in Section 4.2.1. Here, we can see that the
quality of the 10 shortlisted recommendations had an overall tendency to de-
crease in most cases (although there were some exceptions). Figure 9(b) shows
the average UPQ of 15 continuous auctions after convergence (from the 101st to
the 115th auction). By averaging over these auctions, we can see that the UPQ
decreases monotonically. Thus, Figure 9 tells us that our market mechanism
is indeed capable of shortlisting the best recommendations in decreasing order
of UPQ. Through various experiments stated in Section 4.2.1, we ﬁnd that our
market can always do so and our results hold more broadly than just for this
speciﬁc experiment.
4.2.3 Clear Incentives. The next step is to see if the recommending agents
can relate their bids to the INQso ftheir recommendations (meaning an agent
can generate a steady strategy proﬁle). In this case, each recommending agent
builds up its strategy proﬁle from its knowledge about the bids with respect
to its 20 INQ segments. Speciﬁcally, Figure 10(a) shows the bidding prices for
different segments of the ﬁrst recommending agent with effective factors  1
as its INQ.F rom Figure 10(a), we can see that this agent’s bidding prices for
different INQ segments oscillate around certain levels after the market reaches
equilibrium (after about 100 auctions). Figure 10(b) shows the agent’s strategy
proﬁle (equilibrium bidding price versus the INQ segments) and that higher INQ
does indeed relate to higher bidding price. Indeed, this agent evaluates its INQ
on the effective factors, in particular, on those that have a high weighting in
the UPQ (see Equations (6) and (8)). Thus, the agent can relate its bidding price
to its INQ in such a way that the higher the INQ, the higher the corresponding
UPQ, and the higher the bidding price. In this way, the agent maximizes its
revenue. Figure 10(c) shows the bidding prices for different segments of the
seventh agent with the ineffective factor  3 as its INQ, and Figure 10(d) depicts
this agent’s strategy proﬁle (which shows there is no relationship between the
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Fig. 10. Bidding proﬁle and strategy proﬁle of bidders with effective and ineffective factors
(Experiment 1).
bidding price and the INQ). From Figures 10(c) and 10(d), we can see that this
agent’s bidding prices do not reach equilibrium (because the agent has only
ineffective factors as its INQ). Therefore, it cannot relate its bids to its INQ, be-
cause it cannot reason about the relationship between the occasional rewards
and the INQso fthe rewarded recommendations. Since high INQ does not indicate
high UPQ in this case, the UPQ with respect to a speciﬁc INQ segment can vary
dramatically. Therefore, based on the UPQ, the rewards with respect to a speciﬁc
INQ level do not converge (meaning that the agent can learn nothing from the
marketplace). Hence, based on the rewards (see the relationship between the
reward and the bidding price in Equation (1)), the bidding prices with respect
to this INQ level do not converge. Thus, the agent cannot build up a practical
strategy proﬁle after the market converges. Agents with ineffective factor  2
exhibit the same properties as those agents with  3 and we do not comment
further on them.
In addition to the bidding strategy proﬁle, we also examined the revenue and
the number of times these agents won in the auctions. From Figure 11(a), we
can see that the ﬁrst three agents, with the effective factors, win more times
than the remaining six agents (which have ineffective factors). Figure 11(b)
shows that the ﬁrst three agents can make proﬁts whereas the other six make
losses over time. Indeed, the agents with ineffective factors always bid high
enough to be shortlisted (see Section 4.2.5 for more information about equal
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Fig. 11. Number of winning and balance of bidders with effective and ineffective factors
(Experiment 1).
opportunities of being shortlisted), but they are not able to learn anything
from the few occasional rewards that they receive. Thus, these agents pay
more when shortlisted than they earn when rewarded and will eventually go
bankrupt.17
When taken together, Figures 10 and 11 indicate that the agents with effec-
tive factors in terms of UPQ are capable of “learning” from the marketplace to
alter their bids to certain levels in order to chase the equilibrium price. This,
in turn, results in a maximization of their revenue. In contrast, agents with
ineffective factors are not capable of learning from the market. From our obser-
vation of the various simulations, with good correlations to the UPQ,arecom-
mending agent’s strategy proﬁle changes quickly before the market converges
and then becomes relatively stable after convergence.
4.2.4 Stability. To evaluate the stability of the market with respect to bid-
ding strategies, we now consider what happens if some of the agents no longer
follow the dominant strategies of Section 3.3.3. Here we assume the agents
adopt a greedy strategy, meaning they bid as much as possible on every round
to outbid others. To this end, we use the setting of the second experiment in-
troduced in Section 4.2.1 with all nine agents taking the effective factors as
their INQs. However, we select one recommending agent (say the ﬁrst one) as
the greedy bidder with the other agents still taking the dominant strategy.
Here, all recommending agents are endowed with an initial credit of 65535.
The greedy bidder always bids much higher than the others to get its recom-
mendations shortlisted with the hope of making proﬁt. However, this greedy
bidder does not receive any more rewards from its recommendations when com-
pared with the rewarded recommendations provided by the other, nongreedy,
bidders. Indeed, the reward is not based on the bid price, but rather on the UPQ
(for exactly this reason). With the same amount of reward with respect to the
same level of UPQ, however, the greedy bidder pays much more for each of its
17The rational bidding strategy for those agents who cannot learn anything from the market is to
bid as low as possible to lose less money; see Figure 8(c) and its explanation.
ACM Transactions on Information Systems, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2005.Market-Based Approach to Recommender Systems • 257
Fig. 12. Balance of bidders with effective and ineffective factors.
Fig. 13. Opportunity of being shortlisted (Experiment 1).
shortlisted recommendations. Therefore, the greedy bidder goes bankrupt over
time, as shown in Figure 12(a), while the nongreedy bidders keep increasing
their balance steadily. In comparison, when no greedy bidders participate, all
recommending agents keep increasing their balance, as shown in Figure 12(b).
4.2.5 Fairness. We expectthemarkettobefairtoallrecommendingagents
irrespective of the recommendation method they use. To see this, we use the
ﬁrst experiment conﬁguration introduced in Section 4.2.1. From Figure 13, it
can be seen that the curves that represent the number of recommendations
being shortlisted (including both rewarded and not rewarded) for each agent
are close to each other, meaning all agents have an equal opportunity of be-
ing shortlisted. Thus, the market is fair to all agents whatever methods they
use.
However, different methods do not necessarily have an equal opportunity
of being rewarded, as shown in Figure 11(a). This, in turn, highlights the fact
that a fair market does not mean that all agents are equally likely to receive
rewards. Rather, the opportunity of being rewarded depends on the UPQ. There-
fore, fairness of the market means all agents are treated the same.
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4.3 Dealing with Multiple Recommendation Properties
Having evaluated the system properties with respect to the metrics stated in
Section 3.2, this section considers the case where more than one recommen-
dation property ( , introduced in Section 4.1.2) is evaluated by both the user
andtherecommendingagents.Thisisimportantbecausemanyrealrecommen-
dation methods evaluate more than one property (or feature) of recommenda-
tions [Burke 2002; Littlestone and Warmuth 1994] and it is important that our
market-based recommender system perform well in such cases.
However, ﬁrst, we need to establish the conﬁgurations of the three kinds of
agents in our marketplace. Since the auctioneer agent simply acts as the orga-
nizer of the marketplace, rewarding the user-selected recommendations based
on the UPQ, this agent remains the same as in Section 4.1.1. We still use the in-
dependent selection user model with AT = 66. Since it is not practical to gather
up every possible case that contains an arbitrary number of properties ( )i n
one formula (for either UPQ or INQ) and to exemplify the correlations between
these two qualities in a simple set of experiments, we begin the analysis with
two properties involved for each quality function (meaning for both the user
and the recommending agents). The more general cases in which each qual-
ity function evaluates more than two properties can be analyzed in the same
way. To this end, the conﬁguration of the user agent also remains unchanged,
Q(Rec) = 75 1(Rec) + 25 0(Rec). The recommending agents are each conﬁg-
ured to evaluate two properties: some agents share both properties, some share
only one property, and some share no property with the user’s valuation of the
recommendations. In this section, we consider eight recommending agents and
their INQs that are conﬁgured as follows:
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0.75 1(Rec) + 0.25 0(Rec),
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0.75 1(Rec) + 0.25 3(Rec),
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0.75 3(Rec) + 0.25 0(Rec),
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec) = 0.75 2(Rec) + 0.25 3(Rec).
(9)
 0,  1,  2, and  3 are conﬁgured as per Section 4.2.1. With these settings,
we can see that q1 and q5 fully contain the effective factors, and they match
the user’s valuation of recommendations accurately. Likewise, q2, q6, q3, and q7
partiallymatchtheuser’svaluation,whereasq4 andq8 havenomatch.Morefor-
mally,usingatransformationofthe UPQ, Q(Rec) = (75 1(Rec)+25 0(Rec))/100,
to subtract each item in Equation Array (9), we can expect the four methods
to exhibit the following correlations to the UPQ (where“” stands for “has no
relationship to”):
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0.01 · Q(Rec),
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0.01 · Q(Rec) + 0.25 · ( 3(Rec) −  0(Rec)), (9  )
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0.01 · Q(Rec) + 0.75 · ( 3(Rec) −  1(Rec)),
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec)  Q(Rec).
Having conﬁgured the three kinds of agents, we are going to evaluate the
market properties and validate that the correlations in Equation Array (9 )
ACM Transactions on Information Systems, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2005.Market-Based Approach to Recommender Systems • 259
Fig. 14. Convergence of shortlisted prices.
do effect the agents’ bidding and learning behavior. Again, the evaluation be-
gins with the most important system property—market convergence. Figure 14
again demonstrates that the market converges (after about 80 auctions), with
at least one agent capable of relating its INQ to the UPQ (the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth
agents in this experiment).
Using similar simulations to the ones of Section 4.2, we ﬁnd that the market
exhibits the same properties: namely, efﬁcient shortlists, clear incentives for
agentstobid,stability,andfairness.Thus,wedonotfurtherdiscusstheseissues
in this section. Instead, we will focus on how the different recommendation
methods correlate their INQst othe UPQ. This problem can be decomposed into
two subproblems:
(i) Can the agents relate their bids to their internal quality?
(ii) To what extent does each individual agent relate its INQ to the UPQ?
To this end, the strategy proﬁles for four agents (q1, q2, q3, and q4)a tthe
point when the market reaches equilibrium are plotted in Figure 15. From
Figure 15(a), we can see that the ﬁrst agent bids its recommendations from
INQ segments that are above the level of 0.65 at a level that is much higher
than 160, which is actually the equilibrium price of the 10th bid (see Figure 14
after 80 auctions). Since the equilibrium price of the 10th bid represents the
lowest price to be shortlisted, we refer to it as the market access price.F o rthe
ﬁrst agent, both evaluation properties ( 1 and  0) are the effective factors,
and their weightings both match those in the UPQ. Thus, its INQ fully matches
the UPQ. Being capable of relating its INQ to the UPQ, this agent can establish
from which speciﬁc INQ segments its recommendations can be rewarded. From
Figure15(a),wecanalsoseethatbidsfrom INQsegmentsthatarebelowthelevel
of 0.65 are lower than the market access price. Indeed, the ﬁrst agent learns
from the marketplace that these recommendations will not be rewarded, and
so it decreases their price so as not to shortlist these items and avoid paying
for them when they are unlikely to produce a return.
From Figure 15(b), we can see that the second agent bids its recommenda-
tions from very high INQ segments (higher than the level of 0.80) at a level that
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Fig. 15. Strategy proﬁles of bidders with effective and ineffective factors.
is higher than the market access price. The second agent has one of its two
evaluating properties ( 1)a sthe effective factor, and this contributes signiﬁ-
cantly to both the INQ and the UPQ (both with a weighting of 0.75). In this case,
only a very high value of  1 can give a high value of q2 since  1’s weighting is
much bigger than  3’s. Thus, very high INQs indicate high values of UPQ, and,
therefore, such recommendations have good correlations with the user’s pref-
erences. Therefore, the agent only bids on very high INQ recommendations that
are highly likely to be shortlisted. It does this to make proﬁt without incurring
a high risk of losing credits (i.e., being shortlisted but not rewarded).
FromFigure15(c),wecanseethatthethirdagenthasfewsegmentswithbids
higher than the market access price (compared to the ﬁrst and second agents).
The explanation is that, even though one of its two evaluating properties ( 0)
is the effective factor, it contributes too little to its INQ (coefﬁcient value 0.25).
Therefore,its INQcannoteasilyberelatedtothe UPQ.W ithfewerconcretesignals
from the rewards received, it is difﬁcult for the agent to relate its bids to its
INQs. Thus the agent is not conﬁdent enough to bid for certain items at a very
high price (since it has a high risk of losing credits without earning).
Figure 15(d) demonstrates that the fourth agent, having no effective factors,
does not dare to bid high enough for any items from any segments to be short-
listed. It behaves in this way because it does not want to incur the risk of being
shortlisted without receiving any reward. This uncertainty comes from the fact
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Fig. 16. Balance of bidders with effective and ineffective factors.
that the agent cannot effectively relate its INQ to the UPQ. Thus it does not know
what items from which segments match the user’s preference.
When taken together, these experiments show that the agents’ conﬁdence to
relate their bids to the INQ decreases from the ﬁrst agent to the fourth. The-
oretically, this point can be shown in their INQ functions with respect to the
UPQ (see Equations (9 )). Thus, the noise between the four agents’ INQs and the
UPQsi s, respectively, 0, 0.25( 4(Rec) −  0(Rec)), 0.75( 5(Rec) −  1(Rec)), and
full noise. Therefore, the agents’ ability to relate their INQst othe UPQ is in de-
creasing order. On the other hand, since the agents’ bids are based on rewards
and rewards are based on the UPQ, the bids can be related to the UPQ. Thus, the
agents’ ability to relate their INQst otheir bids is in decreasing order. This, in
turn, affects their balance. Speciﬁcally, Figure 16 demonstrates that the more
strongly an agent can relate its INQst oits bids, the more proﬁt it will make.
4.4 Validating the System’s Ability to Seek Out the Best Recommendation
Having evaluated the market with respect to the metrics listed in Section 3.2
and the correlation between the INQ and the UPQ of the recommendations, this
section evaluates the system’s ability to seek out the best item from all the
source recommendations. This is clearly an important feature from the user’s
viewpoint, since if the system cannot recommend the best items, the user will
not use it.
To evaluate this aspect of the system, we use the ﬁrst experiment discussed
in Section 4.2.1 and trace the bidding price of the recommendation with the
highest UPQ value selected by the ﬁrst agent (see Figure 17, in which the cross
points represent the bidding price of this particular recommendation). From
this, we can see that this recommendation’s bidding price keeps increasing till
it converges to the ﬁrst bid price of the shortlisted items. This means that
as long as the ﬁrst agent chooses the highest UPQ recommendation to bid in an
auction round (after the market converges), this item is always displayed in the
ﬁrst slot of the sidebar of the user’s browser. Therefore, in case of either user
model (independent selection or search-till-satisfaction), this recommendation
will be selected by the user, since the ﬁrst shortlisted recommendation has the
highest UPQ. This result shows that the system is capable of seeking out the
best recommendation and presenting it to the user.
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Fig. 17. The best recommendation’s bidding price.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article has investigated the feasibility of building a recommender system
as a computational economy in which the various recommending agents (em-
bodying different methods and having different qualities) compete to get their
recommendations displayed to users. Through the development, analysis, and
evaluation of our marketplace design, we have demonstrated that the system
should be able to make good recommendations to users. In more detail:
(1) The market works as a means of coordinating various recommendation
methodsinanoverarchingsystem.Speciﬁcally,asthereisnouniversalbest
recommendation method for all situations, there is a need to incorporate
multiple methods into a single system so that each such system can con-
tribute the best recommendations in the various circumstances that might
arise. This ensures the peak performance of the overall system.
(2) Our marketplace successfully incentivizes the recommending agents to bid
in a manner that is consistent with the user’s preferences. Speciﬁcally, the
market mechanism uses the reward regime to reﬂect the user’s satisfac-
tion of the recommendations. This ensures the agents receiving rewards
frequently become aware of the types of recommendations that best satisfy
the user.
(3) By analysis, our market is shown to be capable of shortlisting recommen-
dations in decreasing order of UPQ.B ydeﬁning a proportional reward mech-
anism, the market relates the bidding prices to the user’s sidebar slots and
to the UPQ levels. After market convergence, the higher a recommendation’s
UPQ, the higher its price is, and, thus, the higher its shortlisted position.
(4) Bysimulation,ourmarketmechanismisshowntobecapableofsuccessfully
correlating the two perspectives of recommendation quality (internal and
user perceived). As discussed in Section 2, none of the previous systems
correlate them together in an integrated manner. Speciﬁcally, our market
uses the reward and price regime to quantify the UPQ and the various INQ
measures of the individual recommenders. In this system, the bidding price
representsthecostofadvertisingarecommendationwithaspeciﬁc INQlevel
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andtherewardreﬂectstheactualvalueofarecommendationwithaspeciﬁc
UPQ level. Over time, the agent can align its INQ to its bidding price, and its
bidding price to its corresponding reward, and its reward to the UPQ. This
connection enables an agent to relate its INQ to the UPQ.
(5) By decomposing the INQ into linear combinations of evaluation scores on
different properties of recommendations, we ﬁnd that the more the effective
factors inﬂuence the recommending agents’ INQ, the stronger is their ability
to relate their INQ to the UPQ and to make high-quality recommendations.
Having demonstrated the viability of this approach, the next step is to un-
dertake a ﬁeld trial of our recommender system, in which we replace our sim-
ulated users and recommendations with real ones. This will enable us to fully
demonstrate the power and applicability of the approach and to ensure that
the results we have produced through simulations actually hold in practice.
Additionally, there are several other issues that come to the fore in turning our
proof-of-concept system into a fully functioning and operational recommender
system: (i) there is a need to endow the recommender agents with the ability
to effectively learn user’s interests so that they are able to quickly and fre-
quently identify the best items while still maximizing their revenue (see Wei
et al. [2005] for our initial work on this); (ii) while there is much scope for dif-
ferent recommender agents to share information about recommendations and
user interactions in order to improve the computational efﬁciency of the sys-
tem, this sharing needs to be balanced against issues related to maintaining
trust and privacy for the users of our system; (iii) the issue of scalability of our
approach as large numbers of documents are incorporated needs further inves-
tigation; (iv) communication costs between user agents, recommending agents,
and the auctioneer agent may also need to be factored into the system when
large numbers of users and recommendation methods participate.
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